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Abstract. We introduce the linear centralizer method, and use it to devise a provable polynomial
time solution of the Commutator Key Exchange Problem, the computational problem on which, in the
passive adversary model, the security of the Anshel–Anshel–Goldfeld 1999 Commutator key exchange
protocol is based. We also apply this method to solve, in polynomial time, the computational problem
underlying the Centralizer key exchange protocol, introduced by Shpilrain and Ushakov in 2006.
This is the first provable polynomial time cryptanalysis of the Commutator key exchange protocol,
hitherto the most important key exchange protocol in the realm of noncommutative-algebraic cryp-
tography, and the first cryptanalysis (of any kind) of the Centralizer key exchange protocol. Unlike
earlier cryptanalyses of the Commutator key exchange protocol, our cryptanalyses cannot be foiled by
changing the distributions used in the protocol.
1 Introduction
Since Diffie and Hellman’s 1976 key exchange protocol, few alternative proposals for key
exchange protocols (KEPs) resisted cryptanalysis. This, together with the (presently, theo-
retical) issue that the Diffie–Hellman and other classic KEPs can be broken in polynomial
time by quantum computers, is a strong motivation for searching for substantially different
KEPs. Lattice-based KEPs [32] seem to be a viable potential alternative. All classic KEPs
as well as the Lattice-based ones are based on commutative algebraic structures.
In 1999, Anshel, Anshel, and Goldfeld [2] (cf. [3]) introduced the Commutator KEP,
a general method for constructing KEPs based on noncommutative algebraic structures.
Around the same time, Ko, Lee, Cheon, Han, Kang, and Park [21] introduced the Braid
Diffie–Hellman KEP, another general method achieving the same goal. The security of both
KEPs is based on variations of the Conjugacy Search Problem: Given conjugate elements
g, h in a noncommutative group, find x in that group such that x−1gx = h. Both papers [2]
and [21] proposed to use the braid group BN , a finitely presented, infinite noncommutative
group parameterized by a natural number N , as the platform group.
The introduction of the Commutator KEP and the Braid Diffie–Hellman KEP was fol-
lowed by a stream of heuristic attacks (e.g., [16], [17], [25], [15], [11], [27], [12], [13], [18],
[26], [28], [30], [31]),1 demonstrating that these protocols, when using the two most simple
distributions on the braid group BN , are insecure. Consequently, a program was set forth,
by several independent research groups, to find efficiently sampleable distributions on the
braid group that, when used with the above-mentioned protocols, foil all heuristic attacks
(e.g., [26], [22], [14], [1]). The abstract of [14] concludes: “Proper choice . . . produces a
key exchange scheme which is resistant to all known attacks”. Moreover, a very practical
distribution is announced in [38], which foils the strongest known methods for solving the
Conjugacy Search Problem in BN .
1 Surveys of some of the heuristic attacks are provided in Dehornoy [9] and Garber [10].
2Most of the mentioned heuristic attacks address the Commutator KEP, and not the
Braid Diffie–Hellman KEP. The reason is that in 2003, Cheon and Jun published an expected
polynomial time cryptanalysis of the Braid Diffie–Hellman KEP, using a novel representation
theoretic method [8]. In their paper, Cheon and Jun stress that their cryptanalysis does not
apply to the Commutator KEP and that an extra ingredient is needed. Thus far, no expected
polynomial time attack was found on the Commutator KEP, whose success does not depend
on the distributions used in the protocols.
The main result of the present paper is a Las Vegas, provable expected polynomial time
solution of the Commutator Key Exchange Problem (also referred to as the Anshel–Anshel–
Goldfeld Problem [29, §15.1.2]), the computational problem underlying the Commutator
KEP. This forms a cryptanalysis of the Commutator KEP [2], in the passive adversary
model, that succeeds regardless of the distributions used to generate the keys.
The linear centralizer method, developed for our solution of the Commutator Key Ex-
change Problem, is applicable to additional computational problems and KEPs in the con-
text of group theory-based cryptography. We present an application of these methods to the
Centralizer KEP, introduced by Shpilrain and Ushakov in 2006 [36], to obtain an expected
polynomial time attack. This is the first cryptanalysis, of any kind, of the Centralizer KEP.
We stress that the cryptanalyses presented here, like the Cheon–Jun cryptanalysis, while
of expected polynomial time, are impractical for standard values of N (e.g., N = 100).
These results are of theoretic nature. Ignoring logarithmic factors, the complexity of our
cryptanalyses is about N17, times a cubic polynomial in the other relevant parameters.
Incidentally, though, these cryptanalyses establish the first provable practical attacks in the
case where the index N of the braid group BN is small, e.g., when N = 8.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the Commutator KEP and the
braid group. In Section 3, we eliminate a technical complexity theoretic obstacle. Section
4 applies a method of Cheon and Jun to reduce our problem to matrix groups over finite
fields. Section 5 is the main ingredient of our cryptanalysis, presenting the new method
and cryptanalyzing the Commutator KEP in matrix groups. This section is independent
of the other sections and readers without prior knowledge of the braid group may wish to
read it first. Section 6 fills a gap in our proof, by applying the Schwartz–Zippel Lemma to
obtain a lower bound on the probability that certain random matrices are invertible. Section
7 is a cryptanalysis of the Centralizer KEP, using the methods introduced in the earlier
sections. The Braid Diffie–Hellman KEP is introduced in Section 8, where we survey the
Cheon–Jun cryptanalysis and explain why it does not apply to the Commutator KEP or
to the Centralizer KEP. We also describe applications of the new methods to a generalized
version of the Braid Diffie–Hellman KEP and to Stickel’s KEP. Some additional discussion
is provided in Section 9.
2 The Commutator KEP and the braid group BN
We will use, throughout, the following basic notation.
Notation 1 For a noncommutative group G and group elements g, x ∈ G, gx = x−1gx, the
conjugate of g by x.
Useful identities involving this notation, that are easy to verify, include gxy = (gx)y, and
gc = g for every central element c ∈ G, that is, such that ch = hc for all h ∈ G.
3The Commutator KEP [2] is described succinctly in Figure 1.2 In some detail:
1. A noncommutative group G and elements a1, . . . , ak, b1, . . . , bk ∈ G are publicly given.
3
2. Alice and Bob choose free group words in the variables x1, . . . , xk, v(x1, . . . , xk) and
w(x1, . . . , xk), respectively.
4
3. Alice substitutes a1, . . . , ak for x1, . . . , xk, to obtain a secret element a = v(a1, . . . , ak) ∈
G. Similarly, Bob computes b = w(b1, . . . , bk) ∈ G.
4. Alice sends the conjugated elements b1
a, . . . , bk
a to Bob, and Bob sends a1
b, . . . , ak
b to
Alice.
5. The shared key is the commutator a−1b−1ab.
As conjugation is a group isomorphism, we have that
v(a1
b, . . . , ak
b) = v(a1, . . . , ak)
b = ab = b−1ab.
Thus, Alice can compute the shared key a−1b−1ab as a−1v(a1
b, . . . , ak
b), using her secret
a, v(x1, . . . , xk) and the public elements a1
b, . . . , ak
b. Similarly, Bob computes a−1b−1ab as
w(b1
a, . . . , bk
a)−1b.
Alice Public Bob
v(x1, . . . , xk) ∈ Fk a1, . . . , ak ∈ G w(x1, . . . , xk) ∈ Fk
a = v(a1, . . . , ak) b1, . . . , bk ∈ G b = w(b1, . . . , bk)
b1
a
, . . . , bk
a
//
a1
b
, . . . , ak
b
oo
a−1b−1ab = a−1v(a1
b, . . . , ak
b) a−1b−1ab = w(b1
a, . . . , bk
a)−1b
Fig. 1. The Commutator KEP
For the platform group G, it is proposed in [2] to use the braid group BN , a group
parameterized by a natural number N . Elements of BN are called braids, for they may be
identified with braids on N strands. Braid group multiplication is motivated geometrically,
but the details will play no role in the present paper. The interested reader will find detailed
information on BN in almost each of the papers in the bibliography and, in particular, in
2 In our diagrams, green letters indicate publicly known elements, and red ones indicate secret elements, known only
to the secret holders. Results of computations involving elements of both colors may be either publicly known, or
secret, depending on the context. The colors are not necessary to follow the diagrams.
3 By adding elements, if needed, we assume that the number of ai’s is equal to the number of bi’s.
4 A free group word in the variables x1, . . . , xk is a product of the form x
ǫ1
i1
x
ǫ2
i2
· · ·x ǫmim , with i1, . . . , im ∈ {1, . . . , k}
and ǫ1, . . . , ǫm ∈ {1,−1}, and with no subproduct of the form xix
−1
i or x
−1
i xi.
4the survey [6], but prior knowledge is not necessary: we quote here the information needed
for the present paper.
Let SN be the symmetric group of permutations on N symbols. For our purposes, the
braid group BN is a group of elements of the form
(i,p),
where i is an integer, and p is a finite (possibly, empty) sequence of elements of SN , that
is, p = (p1, . . . , pℓ) for some ℓ ≥ 0 and p1, . . . , pℓ ∈ SN . The sequence p = (p1, . . . , pℓ) is
requested to be left weighted (a property whose definition will not be used here), and p1
must not be the involution p(k) = N − k + 1.5
For “generic” braids (i, (p1, . . . , pℓ)) ∈ BN , i is negative and |i| is O(ℓ), but this is not
always the case. Note that the bit-length of an element (i, (p1, . . . , pℓ)) ∈ BN is O(log |i| +
ℓN logN).
Multiplication is defined on BN by an algorithm of complexity O(ℓ
2N logN + log |i|).
Inversion is of linear complexity. Explicit implementations are provided, for example, in [7].
For a passive adversary to extract the shared key of the Commutator KEP out of the
public information, it suffices to solve the following problem, also referred to as the Anshel–
Anshel–Goldfeld Problem [29, §15.1.2].
Problem 2 (Commutator KEP Problem) Let a1, . . . , ak, b1, . . . , bk ∈ BN , each of the
form (i,p) with p of length ≤ ℓ. Let a be a product of at most m elements of {a1, . . . , ak}
±1,
and let b be a product of at most m elements of {b1, . . . , bk}
±1.
Given a1, . . . , ak, b1, . . . , bk, a
b
1, . . . , a
b
k, b
a
1, . . . , b
a
k, compute a
−1b−1ab.
Our solution of Problem 2 consists of several ingredients.
3 Reducing the infimum
The infimum of a braid b = (i,p) is the integer inf(b) := i. As the bit-length of b is
O(log |i| + ℓN logN), an algorithm polynomial in |i| would be at least exponential in the
bit-length. We first remove this obstacle.
In cases where p is the empty sequence, we write (i) instead of (i,p). The properties of
BN include, among others, the following ones.
(a) (i) · (j,p) = (i+ j,p) for all integers i and all (j,p) ∈ BN .
In particular, (i) = (1)i for all i.
(b) (2) · (i,p) = (i,p) · (2) for all for all (i,p) ∈ BN .
Thus, (2j) is a central element of BN for each integer j. If follows that, for each (i,p) ∈ BN ,
(i,p) = (i− (i mod 2)) · (i mod 2,p).
This way, every braid b ∈ BN decomposes to a unique product cb˜, where c is of the form
(2j) (and thus central), and inf(b˜) ∈ {0, 1}.
5 For readers familiar with the braid group, we point out that the sequence (i, (p1, . . . , pℓ)) encodes the left normal
form ∆ip1 · · · pℓ of the braid, in Artin’s presentation, with ∆ being the fundamental, half twist braid on N strands.
5Consider the public information in Figure 1. For each j = 1, . . . , k, decompose as above
aj = cj a˜j,
bj = dj b˜j ,
with cj , dj central and inf(a˜j), inf(b˜j) ∈ {0, 1} for all j = 1, . . . , k. Let
a˜ = v(a˜1, . . . , a˜k);
b˜ = w(b˜1, . . . , b˜k);
c = v(c1, . . . , ck);
d = w(d1, . . . , d˜k).
As the elements cj , dj are central, we have that
a˜ = v(c−11 a1, . . . , c
−1
k ak) = v(c
−1
1 , . . . , c
−1
k ) · v(a1, . . . , ak) = c
−1a.
Similarly, b˜ = d−1b. As c and d are central,
a bj = (cj a˜j)
b = cj a˜
b
j = cj a˜
db˜
j = cj a˜
b˜
j
for all j = 1, . . . , k. Thus, a˜b˜j can be computed for all j. Similarly, b˜
a˜
j can be computed. Now,
a−1b−1ab = (ca˜)−1(db˜)−1(ca˜)(db˜) = a˜−1c−1b˜−1d−1ca˜db˜ = a˜−1b˜−1a˜b˜.
This shows that the Commutator KEP Problem is reducible, in linear time, to the same
problem using a˜1, . . . , a˜k, b˜1, . . . , b˜k instead of a1, . . . , ak, b1, . . . , bk. Thus, we may assume
that
inf(a1), . . . , inf(ak), inf(b1), . . . , inf(bk) ∈ {0, 1}
to start with. Assume that henceforth.
For a braid x = (i,p), let ℓ(p) be the number of permutations in the sequence p. For
integers i, s, let
[i, s] = {x ∈ BN : i ≤ inf(x) ≤ inf(x) + ℓ(x) ≤ s}.
We use the following basic facts about BN :
1. If x1 ∈ [i1, s1] and x2 ∈ [i2, s2], then x1x2 ∈ [i1 + i2, s1 + s2].
2. If x ∈ [i, s], then x−1 ∈ [−s,−i].
Thus, for each x ∈ {a1, . . . , ak, b1, . . . , bk}
±1, x±1 ∈ [−ℓ − 1, ℓ + 1], and therefore, in the
notation of our problem, a, b ∈ [−m(ℓ+ 1), m(ℓ+ 1)]. Thus,
a−1b−1ab ∈ [−4m(ℓ + 1), 4m(ℓ+ 1)].
Corollary 3 In the Commutator KEP Problem, a−1b−1ab ∈ [−4m(ℓ + 1), 4m(ℓ+ 1)].
64 Reducing to a matrix group over a finite field
In this section, we apply methods of Cheon and Jun [8] in our setting.
Let n be a natural number. As usual, we denote the algebra of all n× n matrices over a
field F by Mn(F), and the group of invertible elements of this algebra by GLn(F). A matrix
group is a subgroup of GLn(F). A faithful representation of a group G in GLn(F) is a group
isomorphism from G onto a matrix group H ≤ GLn(F). A group is linear if it has a faithful
representation.
Bigelow and, independently, Krammer, established in their breakthrough papers [5], [23]
that the braid group BN is linear, by proving that the so-called Lawrence–Krammer repre-
sentation
LK: BN −→ GL(N
2
)(Z[t
±1,
1
2
]),
whose dimension is
n :=
(
N
2
)
,
is injective.6 The Lawrence–Krammer representation of a braid can be computed in polyno-
mial time.7 It is proved implicitly in [23], and explicitly in [8], that this representation is also
invertible in (similar) polynomial time. The following result follows from Corollary 1 of [8].
Theorem 4 (Cheon–Jun [8]) Let x ∈ [i, s] in BN . Let M ≥ max(|i|, |s|). Then:
1. The degrees of t in LK(x) ∈ GLn(Z[t
±1, 1
2
]) are in {−M,−M + 1, . . . ,M}.
2. The rational coefficients c
2d
in LK(x) (c integer, d nonnegative integer) satisfy: |c| ≤
2N
2M , |d| ≤ 2NM .
In the notation of Theorem 4, Theorem 2 in Cheon–Jun [8] implies that inversion of
LK(x) is of order N6 logM multiplications of entries. Ignoring logarithmic factors and thus
assuming that each entry multiplication costs NM · N2M = N3M2, this accumulates to
N8M2. We will invert the function LK as part of our cryptanalysis below. However, the
complexity of the other steps in our cryptanalysis (in particular, the linear centralizer step—
Section 5) dominate the complexity of inverting LK.
Let us return to the Commutator KEP Problem 2. By Corollary 3,
K := a−1b−1ab ∈ [−4m(ℓ + 1), 4m(ℓ+ 1)].
Let M = 4m(ℓ+ 1). By Theorem 4, we have that
(22NM tM) · LK(K) ∈ GLn(Z[t]),
the absolute values of the coefficients in this matrix are bounded by 2N
2(M+1), and the
maximal degree of t in this matrix is bounded by 2M .
6 Bigelow proved this theorem for the coefficient ring Z[t±1, q±1] with two variables. Krammer proved, in addition,
that one may replace q by any real number from the interval (0, 1).
7 When the infimum i is polynomial in the other parameters, which we proved in Section 3 that we may assume.
Alternatively, by computing the representation of (i) separately, using properties of the Lawrence–Krammer rep-
resentation.
7Let p be a prime slightly greater than 2N
2M+2NM , and f(t) be an irreducible polynomial
over Zp, of degree d slightly larger than 2M . Then
(22NM tM) · LK(K) = (22NM tM ) · LK(K) mod (p, f(t)) ∈ GLn(Z[t]/〈p, f(t)〉),
under the natural identification of {−(p− 1)/2, . . . , (p− 1)/2} with {0, . . . , p− 1}.
Let F = Z[t]/〈p, f(t)〉 = Z[t±1, 1
2
]/〈p, f(t)〉. F is a finite field of cardinality pd, where d is
the degree of f(t). It follows that the complexity of field operations in F is, up to logarithmic
factors, of order
d2 log p = O(M3N2) = O(m3ℓ3N2).
Thus, the key K can be recovered as follows:
1. Apply the composed function LK(x) mod (p, f(t)) to the input of the Commutator KEP
Problem, to obtain a version of this problem in GLn(F).
2. Solve the problem there, to obtain LK(K) mod (p, f(t)).
3. Compute (22NM tM) · LK(K) mod (p, f(t)) = (22NM tM) · LK(K).8
4. Divide by (22NM tM) to obtain LK(K).
5. Compute K using the Cheon–Jun inversion algorithm.
It remains to devise a polynomial time solution of the Commutator KEP Problem in arbitrary
groups of matrices.
5 Linear centralizers
In this section, we solve the Commutator KEP Problem in matrix groups. We first state the
problem in a general form. As usual, for a group G and elements g1, . . . , gk ∈ G, 〈g1, . . . , gk〉
denotes the subgroup of G generated by g1, . . . , gk. Throughout, we assume that the given
groups are represented in an efficient way.
Problem 5 (Commutator KEP Problem) Let G be a group. Let a1, . . . , ak, b1, . . . , bk ∈
G. Let a ∈ 〈a1, . . . , ak〉, b ∈ 〈b1, . . . , bk〉.
Given a1, . . . , ak, b1, . . . , bk, a
b
1, . . . , a
b
k, b
a
1, . . . , b
a
k, compute a
−1b−1ab.
We recall a classic definition.
Definition 6 Let S ⊆ Mn(F) be a set. The centralizer of S (in Mn(F)) is the set
C(S) = {c ∈ Mn(F) : cs = sc for all s ∈ S}.
For a1, . . . , ak ∈ Mn(F), C({a1, . . . , ak}) is also denoted as C(a1, . . . , ak).
Basic properties of C(S), that are easy to verify, include:
1. C(S) is a vector subspace (indeed, a matrix subalgebra) of Mn(F).
2. C(C(S)) ⊇ S.
3. C(S) = C(spanS).
4. If S ⊆ GLn(F), then C(S) = C(〈S〉), where 〈S〉 is the subgroup of GLn(F) generated by
S.
8 The equality here is over the integers.
8A key observation is the following one: Let V be a vector subspace of Mn(F), and G ≤
GLn(F) be a matrix group such that V ∩G is nonempty. It may be computationally infeasible
to find an element in V ∩G. However, it is easy to compute a basis for V ∩U for any vector
subspace U of Mn(F). In particular, this is true for U = C(C(G)), that contains G. In certain
cases, as the ones below, a “random” element in V ∩ C(C(G)) is as good as one in V ∩G.
Algorithm 7 below addresses the Commutator KEP Problem in a matrix group G ≤
GLn(F). The analysis of this algorithm is based on the forthcoming Lemma 9, which shows
that one can efficiently find an invertible matrix in a vector space of matrices containing at
least one invertible matrix. To this end, we assume that |F|/n ≥ c > 1 for some constant c. In
the above section, |F|/n is at least exponential. Fix a finite set S ⊆ F of cardinality greater
than cn (the larger the better), that can be sampled efficiently. In the most important case,
where F is a finite field, take S = F. By random element of a vector subspace V of Mn(F),
with a prescribed basis {v1, . . . , vd}, we mean a linear combination
α1v1 + · · ·+ αkvk
with α1, . . . , αk ∈ S uniform, independently distributed.
It is natural to split the Commutator KEP Problem and the algorithm for solving it into
an offline (preprocessing) phase and an online phase.
Algorithm 7
Offline phase:
1. Input: b1, . . . , bk ∈ G.
2. Execution:
(a) Compute a basis S = {s1, . . . , sd} for C(b1, . . . , bk), by solving the following homoge-
neous system of linear equations in the n2 entries of the unknown matrix x:
b1 · x = x · b1
...
bk · x = x · bk.
(b) Compute a basis for C(S) = C(C(b1, . . . , bk)), by solving the following homogeneous
system of linear equations in the n2 entries of the unknown matrix x:
s1 · x = x · s1
...
sd · x = x · sd.
3. Output: A basis for C(C(b1, . . . , bk)).
Online phase:
1. Input: a1, . . . , ak, b1, . . . , bk, a
b
1, . . . , a
b
k, b
a
1, . . . , b
a
k ∈ G, where a ∈ 〈a1, . . . , ak〉, b ∈ 〈b1, . . . , bk〉
are unknown.
2. Execution:
(a) Solve the following homogeneous system of linear equations in the n2 entries of the
unknown matrix x:
b1 · x = x · b1
a
...
bk · x = x · bk
a.
9(b) Fix a basis for the solution space, and pick random solutions x until x is invertible.
(c) Solve the following homogeneous system of linear equations in the n2 entries of the
unknown matrix y:
a1 · y = y · a1
b
...
ak · y = y · ak
b,
subject to the linear constraint that y ∈ C(C(b1, . . . , bk)).
(d) Fix a basis for the solution space, and pick random solutions y until y is invertible.
(e) Output: x−1y−1xy.
Let ω be the matrix multiplication constant, that is, the minimal such that matrix mul-
tiplication is O(nω+o(1)). For our applications, one may take ω = log2 7 ≈ 2.81. As usual, Las
Vegas algorithm means an algorithm that always outputs the correct answer in finite time.
For the proof of the following theorem, note that if gx = gy, then gxy
−1
= g, or in other
words, xy−1 ∈ C(g). Finally, note that it does not make much sense to consider the case
where k > n2, in which the matrices become linearly dependent and thus redundant.
Theorem 8 Assume that |F|/n ≥ c > 1 for some constant c, and k ≤ n2. Algorithm 7 is a
Las Vegas algorithm for the Commutator KEP Problem, with running time, in units of field
operations:
1. Offline phase: O(n2ω+2).
2. Online phase: O(kn2ω).
Proof. We use the notation of Algorithm 7. First, assume that the algorithm terminates. We
prove that its output is a−1b−1ab.
x−1y−1xy = x−1y−1(xa−1)ay.
The equations 2(a) in the online phase of Algorithm 7 assert that bi
x = bi
a for all i = 1, . . . , k.
Thus, xa−1 ∈ C(b1, . . . , bk). As y ∈ C(C(b1, . . . , bk)), y commutes with xa
−1, and therefore
so does y−1. Thus,
x−1y−1(xa−1)ay = x−1(xa−1)y−1ay = a−1y−1ay = a−1ay.
By the equations 2(c) in the online phase of Algorithm 7, ai
y = ai
b for all i = 1, . . . , k.
As a ∈ 〈a1, . . . , ak〉, we have that a
y = ab. Indeed, let a = aǫ1i1 · · · a
ǫm
im
. As conjugation is an
isomorphism,
ay = (aǫ1i1 )
y · · · (aǫmim )
y = (ayi1)
ǫ1 · · · (ayim)
ǫm = (abi1)
ǫ1 · · · (abim)
ǫm = (aǫ1i1 )
b · · · (aǫmim )
b = ab.
Thus,
a−1ay = a−1ab = a−1b−1ab.
Thus, the algorithm returns the correct answer when it terminates. It remains to analyze
the running time of the algorithm, which we do step-by-step.
Offline phase, Step 2(a): These are kn2 equations in n2 variables, and thus the running
time is O(k(n2)ω) = O(kn2ω).
10
Offline phase, Step 2(b): As C(b1, . . . , bk) is a vector subspace of Mn(F), its dimension d
is at most n2. Thus, the running time of this step is O(n2 · n2ω) = O(n2ω+2).
Online phase, Step 2(a): The running time is O(kn2ω), as in Step 2(a) of the offline phase.
Online phase, Step 2(b): There is an invertible solution to the equations 2(a), namely: a.
Thus, by the Invertibility Lemma (Lemma 9 below), the probability that a random solution
is not invertible may be assumed arbitrarily close to n/|F| ≤ 1/c < 1. Thus, the expected
number of random elements picked until an invertible one is found is constant. To generate
one random element, one takes a linear combination of a basis of the solution space. If m
is the dimension, then m ≤ n2 and the linear combination takes mn2 ≤ n4 operations.
Checking invertibility is faster. The total expected running time of this step is, therefore,
O(n4), and n4 ≤ n2ω.
Online phase, Step 2(c): Let {s1, . . . , sm} be the basis computed in the offline phase.
Then m ≤ n2. In the present step, one sets y = t1s1 + · · ·+ tmsm, with t1, . . . , tm variables,
and obtains kn2 equations in the m ≤ n2 variables t1, . . . , tm. The complexity is O(
kn2
m
mω),
and kn
2
m
mω = kn2 ·mω−1 ≤ kn2ω.
Online phase, Step 2(d): Using the same arguments as in Step 2(b), the running time of
this step is O(n2ω).
6 Finding an invertible solution when there is one
The results in the previous section assume that we are able to find, efficiently, an invertible
matrix in any subspace of Mn(F) containing an invertible element. This is taken care of by
the following Lemma.
Lemma 9 (Invertibility Lemma) Let a1, . . . , am ∈ Mn(F) be such that
span{a1, . . . , am} ∩GLn(F) 6= ∅.
Let S be a finite subset of F. If α1, . . . , αm are chosen uniformly and independently from S,
then the probability that α1a1 + · · ·+ αmam is invertible is at least 1−
n
|S|
.
Proof. Let
f(t1, . . . , tm) = det(t1a1 + · · ·+ tmam) ∈ F[t1, . . . , tm],
where t1, . . . , tm are scalar variables. This is a determinant of a matrix whose coefficients are
linear in the variables. By the definition of determinant as a sum of products of n elements,
f is a polynomial of degree n. As span{a1, . . . , am} ∩GLn(F) 6= ∅, f is nonzero.
The proof is completed by applying the Schwartz–Zippel Lemma (Lemma 10 below).
For the reader’s convenience, we include a proof for the following classic lemma.
Lemma 10 (Schwartz–Zippel) Let f(t1, . . . , tm) ∈ F[t1, . . . , tm] be a nonzero multivariate
polynomial of degree n. Let S be a finite subset of F. If α1, . . . , αm are chosen uniformly and
independently from S, then the probability that f(α1, . . . , αm) 6= 0 is at least 1−
n
|S|
.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on m.
If m = 1, then f is a univariate polynomial of degree n, and thus has at most n roots.
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For the inductive step, assume that m > 1 and write
f(t1, . . . , tm) = f0(t2, . . . , tm) + f1(t2, . . . , tm)t1 + f2(t2, . . . , tm)t
2
1 + · · ·+ fk(t2, . . . , tm)t
k
1,
with k ≤ n maximal such that fk(t2, . . . , tm) is nonzero. The degree of fk(t2, . . . , tk) is at
most m − k. For each choice of α2, . . . , αm ∈ F with fk(α2, . . . , αm) 6= 0, f(t1, α2, . . . , αm)
is a univariate polynomial of degree k in the variable t1. By the induction hypothesis (for
m = 1), for random α1 ∈ S, f(α1, α2, . . . , αm) is nonzero with probability at least 1− k/|S|.
By the induction hypothesis,
Pr
[
f(α1, . . . , αm) 6= 0
]
≥
≥ Pr
[
fk(α2, . . . , αm) 6= 0
]
· Pr
[
f(α1, . . . , αm) 6= 0 | fk(α2, . . . , αm) 6= 0
]
≥
≥
(
1−
n− k
|S|
)(
1−
k
|S|
)
≥ 1−
n
|S|
.
7 Application to the Centralizer KEP
Definition 11 For a group G and an element g ∈ G, the centralizer of g in G is the set
CG(g) := {h ∈ G : gh = hg}.
The Centralizer KEP, introduced by Shpilrain and Ushakov in 2006 [36], is described in
Figure 2. In this protocol, a1 commutes with b1 and a2 commutes with b2. Consequently, the
keys computed by Alice and Bob are identical, and equal to a1b1ga2b2.
Alice Public Bob
a1 ∈ G g ∈ G b2 ∈ G
g1, . . . , gk ∈ CG(a1)
//
h1, . . . , hk ∈ CG(b2)
oo
a2 ∈ 〈h1, . . . , hk〉 b1 ∈ 〈g1, . . . , gk〉
a1ga2
//
b1gb2
oo
K = a1b1gb2a2 K = b1a1ga2b2
Fig. 2. The Centralizer KEP
As in the Commutator KEP, it is proposed in [36] to use the braid group BN as the
platform group G. The group elements are chosen in a special way, so as to foil attacks
attempted at earlier braid group based KEPs. We apply the methods developed in the
previous sections to obtain an expected polynomial time cryptanalysis of this KEP. We omit
some details, that are similar to those in the earlier sections.
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Problem 12 (Centralizer KEP Problem) Assume that g, a1, b2 ∈ BN , g1, . . . , gk ∈
CBN (a1), h1, . . . , hk ∈ CBN (b2), each of the form (i,p) with p of length ≤ ℓ. Let a2 be a
product of at most m elements of {h1, . . . , hk}
±1, and let b1 be a product of at most m ele-
ments of {g1, . . . , gk}
±1.
Given g, g1, . . . , gk, h1, . . . , hk, a1ga2, b1gb2, compute a1b1ga2b2.
7.1 Solving the Centralizer KEP Problem in matrix groups
For a group G, Z(G) = CG(G) is the set of all central elements of G. Consider the variation
of the Centralizer KEP Problem 12, where the group is G ≤ GLn(F) instead of BN . The
following variation of this problem is formally harder than this variation.9
Problem 13 Let G ≤ GLn(F). Assume that g, a1, b2 ∈ G, g1, . . . , gk ∈ CG(a1), h1, . . . , hk ∈
CG(b2), a2 ∈ 〈{h1, . . . , hk} ∪ Z(G)〉, and b1 ∈ 〈{g1, . . . , gk} ∪ Z(G)〉.
Given g, g1, . . . , gk, h1, . . . , hk, a1ga2, b1gb2, compute a1b1ga2b2.
Following is an algorithm for solving Problem 13. As before, for S ⊆ Mn(F), C(S)
(without subscript) is the centralizer of S in the matrix algebra Mn(F).
Algorithm 14
1. Input: g, g1, . . . , gk, h1, . . . , hk, a1ga2, b1gb2 ∈ G.
2. Execution:
(a) Compute bases for the subspaces C(g1, . . . , gk), C(C(h1, . . . , hk)) of Mn(F).
(b) Solve
x · g = a1ga2 · y
subject to the linear constraints x ∈ C(g1, . . . , gk), y ∈ C(C(h1, . . . , hk)).
(c) Take random linear combinations of the basis of the solution space to obtain solutions
(x, y), until y is invertible.
3. Output: x · b1gb2 · y
−1.
Theorem 15 Let G ≤ GLn(F). Assume that |F|/n ≥ c > 1 for some constant c, and k ≤ n
2.
Algorithm 14 is a Las Vegas algorithm for Problem 13, with running time, in units of field
operations, O(n2ω+2).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 8.
First, assume that the algorithm terminates. We prove that its output is a1b1ga2b2. As
x ∈ C(g1, . . . , gk) and b1 ∈ 〈g1, . . . , gk〉, x commutes with b1. As b2 commutes with h1, . . . , hk,
b2 ∈ C(h1, . . . , hk). As y ∈ C(C(h1, . . . , hk)), y commutes with b2, and therefore so does y
−1.
Thus,
xb1gb2y
−1 = b1xgy
−1b2.
As xg = a1ga2y, xgy
−1 = a1ga2. Thus,
b1xgy
−1b2 = b1a1ga2b2 = a1b1ga2b2.
9 Since Z(G) ⊆ CG(g) for every g ∈ G, the mentioned problems are, under mild technical hypotheses perhaps,
equivalent. We will not use this feature.
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The analysis of the running time of the algorithm is essentially identical to the analysis
in Theorem 8. In Step 2(c), let
H = {(x, y) ∈ C(g1, . . . , gk)× C(C(h1, . . . , hk)) : x · g = a1ga2 · y}
be the solution space, and let (x1, y1), . . . , (xd, yd) be a basis for H . As H is a subspace of
Mn(F) ×Mn(F), d ≤ 2n
2. Let H2 = {y : (x, y) ∈ H}, the projection of H on the second
coordinate. Then
H2 = span{y1, . . . , yd}.
(a1, a
−1
2 ) ∈ H , and thus a
−1
2 ∈ H2. In particular, there is an invertible element in H2. By the
Invertibility Lemma (Lemma 9), a random linear combination of y1, . . . , yd is invertible with
probability at least 1/c. The total expected running time of this step is, therefore, O(n4),
and n4 ≤ n2ω.
7.2 Solving the Centralizer KEP Problem in the braid group
We now address Problem 12. We begin by reducing to the case where our braids have a
restricted form.
In Section 3, we explained how each x ∈ BN can be decomposed (in linear time) as
x = cx˜ with c central and inf(x) ∈ {0, 1}.
We may assume that
inf(g) ∈ {0, 1}.
Indeed, assume that we have an algorithm solving the problem when inf(g) ∈ {0, 1}. Write
g = cg˜ with c central and inf(g) ∈ {0, 1}. Compute
c−1a1ga2 = a1c
−1ga2 = a1g˜a2;
c−1b1gb2 = b1c
−1gb2 = b1g˜b2.
Apply the given algorithm to g˜, g1, . . . , gk, h1, . . . , hk, a1g˜a2, b1g˜b2, to obtain a1b1g˜a2b2. Mul-
tiply by c to obtain a1b1ga2b2.
We may, in addition, assume that
inf(g1), . . . , inf(gk), inf(h1), . . . , inf(hk) ∈ {0, 1},
since when we apply Algorithm 14 in the image of our group in a matrix group, we have in
Problem 13 that
〈{h1, . . . , hk} ∪ Z(G)〉 = 〈{h˜1, . . . , h˜k} ∪ Z(G)〉;
〈{g1, . . . , gk} ∪ Z(G)〉 = 〈{g˜1, . . . , g˜k} ∪ Z(G)〉.
As in Section 3, it follows that
a2, b1 ∈ [−m(ℓ + 1), m(ℓ+ 1)].
Let u = a1ga2 and v = b1gb2. Decompose u = cu˜ and v = dv˜ with c, d central and
inf(u˜), inf(v˜) ∈ {0, 1}. As g ∈ [0, ℓ+ 1] and a1 ∈ [inf(a1), inf(a1) + ℓ],
u = a1ga2 ∈ [inf(a1), inf(a1) + (m+ 1)(ℓ+ 1) + ℓ],
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and thus
a1g(c
−1a2) = u˜ ∈ [0, (m+ 1)(ℓ+ 2)];
c−1a1 = u˜a
−1
2 g
−1 ∈ [−(m+ 1)(ℓ+ 1), (m+ 1)(2ℓ+ 3)].
Similarly,
(d−1b1)gb2 = v˜ ∈ [0, (m+ 1)(ℓ+ 2)].
Finally,
K ′ := a1(d
−1b1)gb2(c
−1a2) = a1v˜(c
−1a2) = (c
−1a1)v˜a2 ∈ [−(m+ 2)(ℓ+ 1), (m+ 1)(4ℓ+ 6)].
Let M = (m+ 2)(4ℓ+ 6). Continue as in Section 3.
By Theorem 4, we have that
(22NM tM ) · LK(K ′) ∈ GLn(Z[t]),
the absolute values of the coefficients in this matrix are bounded by 2N
2(M+1), and the
maximal degree of t in this matrix is bounded by 2M . Let p be a prime slightly greater than
2N
2M , and f(t) be an irreducible polynomial over Zp, of degree d slightly larger than 2M .
Then
(22NM tM) · LK(K ′) = (22NM tM ) · LK(K ′) mod (p, f(t)) ∈ GLn(Z[t]/〈p, f(t)〉),
under the natural identification of {−(p − 1)/2, . . . , (p − 1)/2} with {0, . . . , p − 1}. Let
F = Z[t]/〈p, f(t)〉 = Z[t±1, 1
2
]/〈p, f(t)〉. F is a finite field of cardinality pd, where d is the
degree of f(t). It follows that the complexity of field operations in F is, up to logarithmic
factors, of order
d2 log p = O(M3N2) = O(m3ℓ3N2).
Thus, the key K can be recovered as follows:
1. Apply the composed function LK(x) mod (p, f(t)) to
g, g1, . . . , gk, h1, . . . , hk, u˜ = a1g(c
−1a2), v˜ = (d
−1b1)gb2,
to obtain an input to Problem 13.
2. Solve the problem there, to obtain LK(K ′) mod (p, f(t)).
3. Compute (22NM tM) · LK(K ′) mod (p, f(t)) = (22NM tM ) · LK(K ′).
4. Divide by (22NM tM) to obtain LK(K ′).
5. Compute K ′ using the Cheon–Jun inversion algorithm.
6. Multiply by cd to obtain a1b1ga2b2.
8 Further applications
8.1 The Braid Diffie–Hellman KEP
Figure 3 illustrates the well known Diffie–Hellman KEP. Here, G is a cyclic group of prime
order, generated by a group element g, and exponentiation denotes ordinary exponentiation.
15
Alice Public Bob
a ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p− 1} G = 〈g〉, |G| = p b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}
g
a
//
g
b
oo
K = (gb)a = gba = gab K = (ga)b = gab
Fig. 3. The Diffie–Hellman KEP
Alice Public Bob
a ∈ A A,B ≤ G, g ∈ G, [A,B] = 1 b ∈ B
g
a
//
g
b
oo
K = (gb)a = gba K = (ga)b = gab
Fig. 4. The Braid Diffie–Hellman KEP
Interpreting exponentiation in noncommutative groups as conjugation leads to the Ko–
Lee–Cheon–Han–Kang–Park Braid Diffie–Hellman KEP [21]. For subsets A,B of a group
G, [A,B] = 1 means that a and b commute, ab = ba, for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B. The Braid
Diffie–Hellman KEP is illustrated in Figure 4. Since, in the Braid Diffie–Hellman KEP, the
subgroups A and B of G commute element-wise, the keys computed by Alice and Bob are
identical. It is proposed in [21] to use Artin’s braid group BN as the platform group G for
the Braid Diffie–Hellman KEP, hence the term Braid in the name of this KEP.
In the passive adversary model, the security of the Braid Diffie–Hellman KEP for a
platform group G (Figure 4) is captured by the following problem.
Problem 16 (Diffie–Hellman Conjugacy Problem) Let A and B be subgroups of G
with [A,B] = 1, and let g ∈ G be given. Given a pair (ga, gb) where a ∈ A and b ∈ B, find
gab.
The Cheon–Jun attack on the Braid Diffie–Hellman KEP [8] forms a solution to the Diffie–
Hellman Conjugacy Problem in the case where G is the braid group BN . Their solution can
be described, roughly, as follows. Using the methods described in Section 4, the problem
is reduced to the case where G ≤ GLn(F), a matrix group over a finite field. Since we are
dealing with solutions that are supposed to work for all problem instances, this problem
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is not harder than that where G = GLn(F), the group of all invertible matrices in Mn(F).
However, the latter problem is easy: Assume that B = 〈b1, . . . , bk〉 ≤ G. Solve the system
xga = gx
xb1 = b1x
...
xbk = bkx
of (k+1)n2 linear equations in the n2 entries of the unknown matrix x. There is an invertible
solution to this system, namely, a. Now, any invertible solution a˜ of this system can be used
to compute gab: By the first equation,
ga˜ = a˜−1(ga˜) = a˜−1(a˜ga) = ga.
By the remaining equations, a˜ commutes with the generators of B, and consequently with
all elements of B. Thus, we can compute
(gb)a˜ = gba˜ = ga˜b = (ga˜)b = (ga)b = gab.
This essentially establishes that the Diffie–Hellman Conjugacy Problem in this scenario can
be solved in time O(kn2ω).
Comparison with our approach. The reason why the above-mentioned approach of
Cheon and Jun is not applicable, as is, to the Commutator KEP or to the Centralizer KEP
is that, in either case, there is no prescribed set of generators with which it suffices that
the solution commutes: In the Commutator KEP (Figure 1) it is not clear that a has to
commute with anything. In the Centralizer KEP (Figure 2), we need a2 to commute with
b2, but b2 is secret. The main ingredient in our solution, in both cases, is the replacement
of membership in a subgroup with membership in the double centralizer (in the full matrix
algebra) of that subgroup, and the observation that the latter is efficiently computable. In
other words, instead of adding equations that guarantee that the solution commutes with
prescribed elements, we enlarge the set of solutions by moving to the double centralizer, and
prove the increase in the set of solutions is not too large.
The secondary ingredients of our approach also have something to contribute to the
Cheon–Jun attack: First, in [8] the dependence of the complexity on the infimum i is expo-
nential (in the bit-length of i). This can be eliminated using the infimum reduction methods
of Sections 3 and 7.2. Second, the fact that the solution to the above-mentioned system of
equations is invertible with overwhelming probability is not proved in [8].10 This gap may be
filled using the Invertibility Lemma (Lemma 9). Third, our approach may be used to push
most of the work to the offline phase.
Theorem 17 Assume that |F|/n ≥ c > 1. The Diffie–Hellman Conjugacy Problem for
a matrix group G ≤ GLn(F) and B = 〈b1, . . . , bk〉 is solvable in O(kn
2ω) offline time and
O(n2ω) online Las Vegas time. More precisely, the running time of the online phase is O(n2ω),
plus O(nω) Las Vegas time.
10 An argument involving Zariski density is provided in [8], but this seems to be a heuristic argument; not one
intended to be a rigorous proof.
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Proof. Offline phase: Compute a basis for the centralizer C(B) in the matrix algebra Mn(F),
a solution space of a system of kn2 linear equations in the n2 entries of the variable matrix
x. Since C(B) is a subspace of the vector space Mn(F), its dimension d is at most n
2. Let
c1, . . . , cd be a basis for C(B).
Online phase: Given ga, solve xga = gx subject to x ∈ C(B), a linear system of n2
equations in d scalar variables. Let H be the solution space. Let h1, . . . , hd˜ be a basis for H .
Then d˜ ≤ d.
There is an invertible element in H , namely: a. By the Invertibility Lemma (Lemma 9),
if t1, . . . , td˜ are chosen uniformly and independently from a large subset of F, then the matrix
a˜ = t1h1 + · · ·+ td˜hd˜ is invertible with probability at least 1/c. Having found such invertible
a˜, compute
ga˜ = a˜−1(ga˜) = a˜−1(a˜ga) = ga.
The running time of the online phase is O(n2ω), plus O(nω) Las Vegas time for the expected
constant number of n× n matrix inversions.
Remark 18 In the complexity of the offline phase in Theorem 17, k can be taken to be
the minimum among the number of generators of A and the number of generators of B, by
exchanging the roles of A and B.
8.2 Double Coset KEPs
In 2001, Cha, Ko, Lee, Han and Cheon [7] proposed a variation of the Braid Diffie–Hellman
KEP (Figure 4). For this variation, Cheon and Jun [8] described a convincing variation
of their attack. Another variation of this protocol was proposed in 2005, by Shpilrain and
Ushakov [35]. Both variations, as well as the Braid Diffie–Hellman KEP, are special cases of
the protocol illustrated in Figure 5.
Alice Public Bob
a1 ∈ A1, a2 ∈ A2 A1, A2, B1, B2 ≤ G, g ∈ G, [Ai, Bi] = 1 b1 ∈ B1, b2 ∈ B2
a1ga2
//
b1gb2
oo
K = a1b1gb2a2 K = b1a1ga2b2
Fig. 5. The Double Coset KEP
The methods of Theorem 17 extend to the Double Coset KEP. Here too, the restriction
to matrix groups is with no loss of generality, and we obtain an expected polynomial time
solution of the underlying problem in the braid group BN .
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Theorem 19 Assume that |F|/n ≥ c > 1. Let A1, A2, B1 = 〈b1, . . . , bk〉, B2 = 〈b
′
1, . . . , b
′
l〉 ≤
G ≤ GLn(F), with [A1, B1] = [A2, B2] = 1, and g ∈ G. After an offline computation of
complexity O((k + l)n2ω), one can, given a1ga2, b1gb2, compute a1b1ga2b2 in time O(n
2ω),
plus O(nω) Las Vegas time.
Proof. Offline phase: Compute a basis for the centralizers C(B1), C(B2) in the matrix algebra
Mn(F), by solving one system of kn
2 linear equations in n2 variables, and another system of
ln2 linear equations in n2 variables. Let c1, . . . , cd1 be a basis for C(B1), and c
′
1, . . . , c
′
d2
be a
basis for C(B2). d1, d2 ≤ n
2.
Online phase: Given a1ga2, solve x(a1ga2) = gy subject to x ∈ C(B1), y ∈ C(B2), a
system of n2 equations in d1 + d2 ≤ 2n
2 scalar variables. Let H be the solution space,
H = {(x, y) ∈ C(B1)× C(B2) : x(a1ga2) = gy},
and let (h1, g1), . . . , (hd, gd) be a basis for H . d ≤ d1 + d2 ≤ 2n
2.
Let H1 = {x : (xy) ∈ H} be the projection of H on the first coordinate. Then
{h1, . . . , hd} spans H1. There is an element (x, y) ∈ H with x (and y) invertible, namely:
(a−11 , a2). Thus, there is an invertible element in H1. By Lemma 9, if t1, . . . , td are chosen
uniformly and independently from a large subset of F, then the matrix x = t1h1 + · · ·+ tdhd
is invertible with probability at least 1/c. Let a˜2 = t1g1 + · · · + tdgd. Then (x, a˜2) ∈ H .
Compute a˜1 = x
−1. Then
a˜1ga˜2 = x
−1(ga˜2) = x
−1(xa1ga2) = a1ga2.
As x ∈ C(B1), a˜1 ∈ C(B1). Compute
a˜1b1gb2a˜2 = b1a˜1ga˜2b2 = b1a1ga2b2 = a1b1ga2b2.
An interesting further application is to Stickel’s KEP [37]. This KEP was cryptanalyzed
by Shpilrain in [34], describing a heuristic cryptanalysis and supporting it by experimental
results. Stickel’s KEP is a special case of the Double Coset KEP, where G = GLn(F),
A1 = B1 = 〈{a} ∪ Z(G)〉, and A2 = B2 = 〈b〉 (a, b public). By Theorem 19, Shpilrain’s
cryptanalysis can be turned into a provable Las Vegas algorithm that runs in expected
polynomial time, i.e., one supported by a rigorous mathematical proof. In particular, in this
way, it is guaranteed that changing the distributions according to which the protocol chooses
the involved group elements would not defeat the mentioned polynomial time cryptanalysis.
9 Additional comments
Ignoring logarithmic factors, the overall complexity of the algorithms presented here is
n2ω+2 = N4ω+4 field operations, that are of complexity m3ℓ3N2. Thus, the complexity of
our algorithms is
N4ω+6m3ℓ3,
ignoring logarithmic factors. While polynomial, this complexity is practical only for braid
groups of small index N . However, these algorithms constitute the first provable polynomial
time cryptanalyses of the Commutator KEP and of the Centralizer KEP.
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The main novelty of our approach lies in the usage of linear centralizers (and double
centralizers). However, also the secondary ingredients of our analysis may be of interest. In
particular, we have shown that the Invertibility Lemma can be used to turn the Cheon–
Jun cryptanalysis of the Braid Diffie–Hellman KEP [8] and the Shpilrain cryptanalysis of
Stickel’s KEP [34] into provable Las Vegas algorithm that runs in expected polynomial time,
and that the infimum reduction method can be applied to the Cheon–Jun attack to eliminate
the exponential dependence on the bit-length of the infimum.
The major challenge is to reduce the degree of N in the polynomial time cryptanaly-
ses. By Chinese Remaindering or p-adic lifting methods, it may be possible to reduce the
complexity contributed by the field operations. Apparently, this may reduce the power of
N by 1. It should be possible to make sure that the Invertibility Lemma is still applicable
when these methods are used. Much of the complexity comes from the Lawrence–Krammer
representation having dimension quadratic in N . Unfortunately, it is conjectured that there
are no faithful representations of BN of smaller dimension. A more careful analysis of the
Lawrence–Krammer representation may yield finer estimates. However, it does not seem that
any of these directions would make the attacks practical for, say, N = 100.
One may wonder whether, from the complexity theoretic point of view, this paper may
be the end of braid-based cryptography. Our belief is that this is not the case. For example,
consider Kurt’s Triple Decomposition KEP ([24], [29, 4.2.5]), described in Figure 6. In this
figure, an edge between two subgroups means that these subgroups commute elementwise.
This ensures that the keys computed by Alice and Bob are both equal to ab1a1b2a2b.
Alice Public Bob
a, a1, a2, x1, x2
A A1 A2 X1 X2
| | | |
Y1 Y2 B1 B2 B
≤ G y1, y2, b1, b2, b
ax1, x
−1
1 a1x2, x
−1
2 a2
//
b1y1, y
−1
1 b2y2, y
−1
2 b
oo
K = ab1y1a1y
−1
1
b2y2a2y
−1
2
b K = ax1b1x
−1
1
a1x2b2x
−1
2
a2b
Fig. 6. The Triple Decomposition KEP
We do not, at present, know whether the Triple Decomposition KEP can be cryptanalyzed
using the methods presented here, or whether there is a provable, efficient cryptanalysis
at all. Additional KEPs to which the present methods do not seem to be applicable are
introduced by Kalka in [19] and [20]. There are additional types of braid-based schemes
(e.g., authentication schemes), that cannot be attacked using the methods presented here.
Some examples are reviewed in the monograph [29].
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Changing the platform group in any of the studied KEPs is a very interesting option.
There are efficiently implementable, infinite groups with no faithful representations as matrix
groups (e.g., the braided Thompson group).11
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mutator KEP, Arkadius Kalka pointed out an obstacle mentioned by Shpilrain and Ushakov,
that struck me as solvable by linear centralizers. I am indebted to Kalka for making the right
comment at the right time.
I also thank David Garber, Arkadius Kalka, and Eliav Levy, and the referees, for com-
ments leading to improvements in the presentation of this paper.
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